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Introduction, Overview, and Policy Implications
In many member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), international labor migration and remittances received by relatives at home now play a large role in financing private consumption and in shaping the labor supply and education decisions of households. Remittances received range from 8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in Ukraine to more than 30 percent in Moldova according to the latest internationally comparable estimates (see Section 2 for details).
At the same time, migration and remittances matter not only at the level of individual households. The large size of remittances suggests that they have probably affected output and income distribution not only directly at the level of remittance-receiving households, but also through general-equilibrium or indirect channels. For example, in many CIS countries, a large share of government revenues derives from taxes on imports (especially VAT), which grew rapidly as a result of growing remittance inflows. With higher revenues, governments were able to maintain and expand social transfers so that transfer-receiving households may have benefited indirectly from migration and remittances although they received no remittances of their own. Furthermore, the growth of remittances since approximately the year 2000 has coincided in most CIS countries with the recovery of GDP from its transitioninduced precipitous fall during the 1990s. This coincidence of remittances and GDP growth raises the question of how labor migration and remittances may have contributed to the economic recovery in most CIS countries since 2000.
This paper presents case studies for several CIS countries that seek to assess the indirect effects of labor migration and remittances on income distribution and structural change systematically. The case studies are based on single country computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. While the direct impact of migration and remittances at the household level has been studied through household-level analyses in many countries, much less work has been done on indirect (or general equilibrium) effects. The case studies cover several net emigration countries -Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan -as well as Russia, which has recently experienced both emigration and immigration.
Section 2 describes the overall macroeconomic context in which the sharp increase in labor migration and remittances since approximately the year 2000 occurred. In terms of the main categories of macroeconomic demand, household final consumption has grown more strongly than GDP since 2000 in the five sample countries. By contrast, the evolution of government consumption was rather diverse. Fixed capital formation only began to grow with a lag of several years after the pickup in GDP in most countries, although the transition-induced fall had reduced fixed investment to a very low level in most countries that would not have been sufficient to prevent a gradual depletion of the existing capital stock. This overall picture is consistent with a view of GDP growth as initially driven from the demand side, with households' disposable incomes growing because of remittances, a subsequent real appreciation and expansion of non-tradable sectors, and a late response from investment.
Section 3 presents the case studies on net emigration countries. In Moldova (Section 3.1), the best estimates available suggest that remittances reached one third of GDP in 2006 while the number of migrants abroad amounted to about one quarter of the working population (including migrants). These estimates count only those migrants who are still part of a household in Moldova (i.e. contribute to household income and share in expenditures); remittances may include transfers from individuals who have left Moldova permanently. Labor migration from Moldova is remarkable in that poorer households are more likely to send a migrant abroad than richer ones, contrary to the situation in many other countries where barriers to emigration are more difficult to overcome for poor, credit-constrained households. In the case of Moldova, the poor and low-skilled have the option of taking up employment in Russia, where travel is visa-free and cheap, although working conditions and wages are often poor. By contrast, the EU (especially Italy and Portugal) would be preferred as a host country by many migrants because of better pay and conditions, but high up-front costs for illegal travel make this a difficult proposition for many poor households.
Our simulation results suggest all household groups in Moldova would lose substantially in the absence of migration and remittances. In relative terms, the losses would be largest for small farmers because (i) migration, including for seasonal work, is very widespread in the countryside, and (ii) higher disposable incomes in the population at large are strengthening demand for local food products. As expected, private consumption would be one third lower, with a smaller reduction in GDP of approximately one tenth. The only sector that would gain significantly is light industry, mostly through much higher exports; this simulation result is in line with a conventional Dutch disease effect.
For the case of Ukraine (Section 3.2), our simulations also reveal quite notable effects of migration and remittances. For example, the country's hypothetical economy would have lost up to 7% of its potential without migration and remittance-induced effects. All types of households benefit from remittances substantially: their overall consumption would have been lower by 14 to 21 percent in the hypothetical "migration and remittance free" economy. Rich urban households are set to win the most, while households with income coming mostly in form of government transfers gain the least from remittances and their economy-wide effects. On production side, light and food industry are the key beneficiaries of remittance-driven demand effects. On the other hand, local machinery, construction and public administration sectors appear to be quite remittance-neutral.
In the case of Georgia (Section 3.3), emigration and inward remittance flows have a strong macroeconomic growth effect at the aggregated level; however, not all sectors and residents are affected symmetrically. The positive effect of remittances is pronounced in manufacturing output, large-scale agricultural production, construction, and service sectors concentrated mostly in the urban areas of the country. The impact on the production of household farmers (or small agriculture) is two-fold, depending on the geographical location and identity of households. In distant regions with high transaction costs, for example, farm production increases substantially, while in regions with lower transaction cost it decreases, once farmers have access to remittance incomes. As a result, the impact of remittances is rather limited in terms of poverty reduction and income inequality, especially, in rural areas. Namely, the magnitude of the impact on the consumption pattern is smallest for the group of poor and middle-income rural households and largest for urban households with higher incomes. Consequently, the wealthier members of the society gain from remittances more than poorer household categories. Better access to labor markets, on the contrary, would improve the welfare states of many, especially, of the rural poor at the outset.
These simulation results for Georgia suggest that government and donor policies should prioritize a pro-poor approach in improving institutions within the country, especially by improving access to labor and credit markets. With the focus on the inclusion of the rural poor in the financial sector, for example, policies could be designed for meeting the production needs of farmers in distant regions. This would include opportunities to link remittance flows with family-based microfinance mechanisms focused on promoting saving, insurance and investment within a give region, as well as decreasing transaction costs across regions.
In Kyrgyzstan (Section 3.4) remittances also play a very important role in the economy; by official estimates for 2007, remittances exceeded one quarter of the country's GDP. The number of labor migrants is estimated at 15-20% of total labor force in the country; their main destination countries are Russia and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyz labor migrants represent all segments of the society, but majority of them originate from labor abundant and land scarce rural areas and small towns in the southern part of the country. While wealthier households receive more remittances than poor ones because of better education and access to information, the role of remittances is larger for poor households. Private consumption and government revenues (through taxation of remittance-driven imports) depend substantially on remittances. In the absence of migration, all types of households would be worse off, with considerable losses for GDP, private and government consumption.
The situation in Russia (Section 4) mirrors in some way the emigration countries as Russia is the predominant destination for labor migrants within the CIS. Inward labor migration has come to play a significant role in the Russian economy. Our CGE-model-based simulations are designed to assess the direct and indirect effects of migration on the sectoral structure of the Russian economy. An increase in labor migration increases the supply of labor for all industries, pushes wages down, and raises rent (capital income). The fall in the wage rate drives domestic prices down and stimulates exports. The price ratio of tradables to nontradables increases, along with the real and nominal exchange rates, all implying a real depreciation of the Russian currency. Both the direct and the indirect effects work in the same direction, with the indirect effects dominating.
While these country case studies do not analyze specific policy measures, they demonstrate large potential benefits from labor migration and remittances for migrants' home countries. These potential benefits, as well as the attending risks, depend in important ways on government policies related to migration in both, home and host countries. Against the backdrop of the migration-related policies currently pursued in the CIS region and in the EU, four major policy implications emerge.
First, some CIS country governments faced with large migrant outflows have been reluctant, for political reasons, to even acknowledge that emigration is taking place on a large scale. Consequently, they have failed to provide support services to migrants where such services would enhance the benefits from migration, limit the risks, and strengthen migrants' attachment to their home country. Such services include job placement into legal work abroad through official employment agencies, high-quality consular services for migrants abroad, advocacy with partner governments for limited-term work opportunities for their residents, etc. The absence of such support has made migration more costly to households, without offering attractive alternatives, and alienated migrants from their home country. By contrast, a forward-looking policy strategy for home countries would be to support migrants where they are most at risk, such as when seeking employment and dealing with host country authorities. This would render it more likely that migrants would favorably consider employment or investment opportunities at home in the future.
Second, for economic recovery to take hold in the smaller, natural-resource-poor CIS countries, fixed investment needs to be sustained and increased further. Remittances could help to pay for such investment. However, the business and investment climate in many of these countries is so poor that, currently, remittances are only rarely used for productive investment. Government efforts to channel remittances into investment, which are debated in many CIS countries, will succeed only when all investors -migrants and non-migrants, politically well-connected or not -can expect to receive an adequate return on productive investments that is not diminished by parasitic public institutions.
Third, to promote social coherence in emigration countries, prudent government policies are called for to ensure that the income gains due to migration are shared, to some degree at least, by all households. Taxes on remittances are usually considered counterproductive as income from legal employment is already taxed in the host country and, in any case, remittances might simply be driven underground. However, since many CIS country governments rely on taxes on imports (especially VAT, but also import duties) for much of their revenue, government revenue typically increases along with remittance-driven imports (which are bought over-proportionately by migrant households). The extra government revenue can be used to maintain public infrastructure, provide social services and education (including to the children of migrants left at home or with relatives), and provide targeted income support.
Fourth, destination countries will increasingly find themselves competing not only for highskilled migrants, but also for those willing to perform jobs that are otherwise difficult to fill (such as seasonal work in agriculture, construction, and social services). Russia, the most important host country for migrants from the CIS region, is currently offering legal employment on a fairly broad basis, but migrants' living conditions are frequently poor and harassment by authorities is endemic. Extending legal residence and employment to a larger share of migrants already in Russia, and strengthening the rule of law and ensuring fair treatment for migrants by authorities, would help to attract the growing numbers of immigrants that Russia will want to rely on as its economic growth continues.
In EU countries, legal employment opportunities for CIS country migrants are still severely limited but growing. Legalization programs in countries such as Italy and Portugal also create pockets of legal migrants that will probably become the hubs of migrant networks that will attract more family-based and other immigration from CIS countries in the future. It would be in the interest of both migrants and EU host countries to replace these haphazard legalizations with a forward-looking strategy for admitting migrants with good job prospects in the EU. Since the EU functions as a single labor market, such programs should be coordinated at the EU rather than the national level. For the benefit of both, CIS countries and the EU, the deepening of bilateral relations under European Neighborhood Policy should include enhanced opportunities for legal labor migration.
The Macroeconomic Context
The stylized facts of macroeconomic development in the CIS countries during the last two decades are straightforward. After the disintegration of the former Soviet Union in 1991, GDP fell sharply in all CIS countries (Figure 2 .1). This precipitous fall was followed by prolonged stagnation at a low level during the second half of the 1990s, with some further losses as a result of the Russian financial crisis in 1998. A sustained recovery began around 2000 in most countries and still continues as of mid-2008. While total output is still below its preindependence level in most CIS countries, household final consumption expenditures have recovered much better and in some countries will probably exceed their 1990 levels by the end of the 2010 (Figure 2 .2). By contrast, fixed investment has recovered much less (Figure 2. 3), and the picture for government final consumption is mixed across countries (Figure 2 .4).
The driving forces behind this development are somewhat less clear. Indeed, they have been the subject of contentious debates that evolved considerably as events unfolded. The postindependence output collapse is probably explained largely by the rapid collapse of institutions that regulated trade during the Soviet period, while initially the necessary institutional infrastructure for market-based economic relations (functioning currencies, hard The gradual emergence of market-enabling institutions helps to explain why trade among the CIS countries, along with output, stabilized during the mid-1990s. However, observers continued to note many persistent shortcomings regarding corporate governance, the business climate, and the investment environment. Therefore, the sustained recovery since 2000 is more difficult to explain. Indeed, investment appears to have lagged, rather than led, the output recovery. One factor that has clearly played a role in the recovery is the resurgence of Russian import demand for CIS products on the heels of rising world market prices for energy materials since the late 1990s. Given the Dutch-disease type effects of both, rising oil and gas revenues in Russia and remittances received in the net emigration countries, rising demand for non-tradable goods and services must have been another important driving force supporting the recovery.
The evolution of remittances received in our net emigration countries provides preliminary support for this hypothesis (Figure 2 .5). These data are from balance of payments statistics and their quality varies widely across countries, especially with respect to whether they include estimates of transfers through informal channels in addition to the banking system and Georgia Kyrgyz Republic Moldova Russia Ukraine money transfer operators. For every country, however, there is a substantial increase from about the year 2000. The picture for Georgia is more nuanced in that there were substantial remittances as early as the mid-1990s; however, Georgia's GDP also began to recover at that time.
Balance of payments data for Russia (the host country to most labor migrants from CIS countries) represent the mirror image of these developments. Remittances paid rose to close to US$ 12 billion in 2006 from around US$ 1 billion in 2001 (Figure 2 .6).
Estimates of migrant populations world-wide have recently become available, along with flows of remittances in 2006. Although these estimates are subject to many uncertainties, they represent the best estimates available across a wide range of countries, drawing on a wide variety of national data sources. Remittances are estimated at close to one third of GDP in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova, and at about one fifth in Georgia. Although much larger in absolute terms, remittances in Ukraine amount to less than one tenth of GDP. In Russia, remittances received from emigrants are small by comparison at less than 2 percent of GDP. The large number of emigrants estimated for Russia and Ukraine reflects in part large groups of ethnic Russian and Ukrainian long-term residents in other countries of the Former Soviet Union, rather than recent emigrants to richer countries. Many of these have probably resided there since before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991; their motivations for staying or leaving in their host countries are therefore bound to be rather different from recent labor migrants. (Lofgren et al. 2002) which has been widely applied to developing countries. Its straightforward basic structure with standard neoclassical assumptions, its user-friendly and well-documented code (in GAMS software), and its easy adaptability to national circumstances (different levels of aggregation for households, the agricultural sector, etc.) render it well-suited for the present analysis.
We also explored the feasibility of using a recursive-dynamic version of the IFPRI standard CGE model to complement our comparative-static simulations. A more explicitly dynamic structure would reflect the investment process more accurately and thereby provide additional insights into the growth effects of remittances. However, the additional assumptions required to implement a recursive-dynamic model turned out to be far-reaching. Overall, we would have introduced a high level of arbitrariness into the analysis such that the more detailed description of the investment process in the recursive-dynamic model would ultimately have been meaningless.
In constructing the social accounting matrices, we combine input output tables, other national accounts information, household budget surveys, labor force statistics, and fiscal statistics, among other data sources. A key difficulty is that official data tend to understate migration and remittances in some countries because a large proportion of remittances are transferred as foreign exchange cash and much migrant employment is informal. For the databases to reflect realistic orders of magnitude, various data sources are drawn upon and appropriate adjustments made. The level of aggregation (number of commodities, sectors, factors of production, and household types) differs slightly across the country studies.
Each of the following country studies starts with a discussion of the data situation and goes on to report simulation results that seek to answer the question of what each economy would look like without migration and remittances. These effects are disaggregated by household typed and followed through the economy. In part, TFP growth may have been a natural result of the recovery from the transition-induced crisis, for example due to the emergence of market-supporting institutions as systemic transformation takes hold. To this extent, TFP growth might have occurred even in the absence of migration. However, we consider it plausible that most of the apparent TFP growth results from higher utilization rates for existing production capacity that arose as a consequence of remittances-induced demand growth.
Moldova
The second and third simulations separately describe the impact of a sharp reduction in remittances and a larger domestic labor supply (if there is no labor migration). The fourth simulation combines lower remittances and larger labor supply, and the fifth simulation adds lower TFP.
Our simulation results suggest that all household groups in Moldova would lose substantially in the absence of migration and remittances. In relative terms, the losses would be largest for small farmers because (i) migration, including for seasonal work, is very widespread in the countryside, and (ii) higher disposable incomes in the population at large are strengthening demand for local food products. As expected, private consumption would be about one third lower, with a smaller reduction in GDP of approximately one tenth. The Moldovan currency would depreciate in real terms. The only sector whose output would grow significantly is light industry, with much higher exports. This simulation result is in line with a conventional Dutch disease effect as a result of the inflow of foreign currency through remittances.
Interestingly, textile and clothing exports from Moldova to the European Union expanded very substantially in 2007 and 2008, although migration and remittances as well as the trend for a real appreciation of the Moldovan currency have continued uninterrupted since 2004. These recent developments suggest that barriers to trade, rather than high and rising production costs because of a Dutch-disease-style real appreciation, were an important impediment to the expansion of the Moldovan textile and clothing sector (which is still the only viable non-food export industry). Romania's accession to the European Union caused Moldova to become a direct EU neighbor, separated by only one border from the European single market; it appears that the resulting reduction in informal trade barriers was sufficient to set off the recent wave of foreign direct investment in the textile and clothing industry. 
Migration data
According to several alternative studies, the overall stock of Ukrainian labor migrants working abroad during the late 1990s and early 2000s ranged from 0.8 to 2 million persons. The latest ILO survey reveals about 780 000 Ukrainians labor migrants in other countries (about 3.5 -4% of total labor force) (IOM 2006) . These numbers contrast sharply with much lower official data on employment permits for Ukrainians working abroad (only 61,400 permits were granted by resident employment intermediaries in 2006). Of these, more than two thirds are typically for EU countries, especially Cyprus, Greece, and the UK.
The latest full-fledged research of labor migration trends in Ukraine was completed in 2001 when the State Statistics Committee conducted a survey of 18 000 households in 8 regions (oblasts). The number of labor emigrants in the selected 8 oblasts was estimated at 380 000 persons. Extrapolation to the whole country gives about 800 000 labor migrants. According to the survey about 60% of all migrants were employed in countries which are currently the members of the enlarged EU. The most attractive destinations for Ukrainian that time were Poland (hosting about 18% of Ukrainian labor migrants), Czech Republic (17%), Italy (8.5%), and Portugal (3.8%) (Poznyak 2002) .
Another survey of Ukrainian households in eight Western regions of Ukraine in 2005
indicates that ranking of most popular destinations among Ukrainian migrants changed somewhat. Italy topped the list of most desired destinations with 60% of votes, followed by Portugal (31%), Spain (24%), and Poland (23%). Out of ten most frequently mentioned countries, seven were the EU member states (Starodub, Parkhomenko 2005).
The true scale of Ukrainian labor migrants' presence in some European countries was revealed during regularization programs. In 2002 the Italian government ran a two-month regularization program for domestic workers and contract workers. Out of 341 000 of applications from domestic workers, 27 percent were submitted by Ukrainians. During the regularization program in Portugal running from January 2001 till March 2003, more than 62,000 temporary work permits (out of a total of 180,000) were granted to Ukrainians (Poznyak 2006 ).
The share of Ukrainian labor emigrants coming from small cities is estimated at 42% while villagers account for about 29% and people from big cities make 25% of total number of labor migrants. Migrants from the capital accounted for just 3.0% of overall migrants stock abroad while Kyiv population exceeds 6.5% of the country population. In terms of professional structure most of Ukrainian men working abroad are construction or agricultural workers. At the same time, most of women choose to be employed as domestic workers.
Remittances data
Statistics on migrants' remittances in Ukraine are fragmentary and data from different sources difficult to reconcile. According to WB study, migrant's remittance to Ukraine and Moldova (the countries are treated as one sub-region in the study) totaled some USD 0.44bn (Mansoor, Quillin 2006) . 3 Although the absolute numbers on remittances seem to be strongly underestimated under the WB's approach, the geographical distribution of remittance inflow is worth attention. About 50% of remittances to the region come from EU-15 countries, while 37% originated from Russia and other CIS resource-rich countries. Another 5% are attributed to remittances from new EU member states.
Another recent study by International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) puts Ukraine among the top world nations receiving the largest amount of migrants' remittances in absolute terms. The IFAD estimated total remittances transferred to Ukraine in 2006 at USD 8.5bn, or 8.0% of the country's GDP that year. To compare, inward remittances are estimated at USD 13.9bn for Russia, USD 4.8bn for Romania, and USD 4.8bn for Poland (IFAD 2006) .
Ukrainian official statistics on total workers' remittances and labor income abroad are far from complete and reliable. According to the balance of payments, Ukrainian workers received USD 171 million of factor income abroad and transferred USD 193 million as remittances in 2004. This is unrealistically low, given large-scale labor out-migration from the country. In order to upgrade statistics we classify transfers to "other sectors" as workers' remittances in line with the OECD recommendations. This gives us more realistic overall USD 2.4bn of transfers into Ukraine, or 7 percent of total household's consumption.
Remittances are crucial for many Ukrainian households and regions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that remittances-induced domestic demand was the key factor behind dynamic development of local manufacturing in Western Ukraine. Migrants' remittances are spent in a number of ways: according to results of regional survey, most money earned abroad are spent on purchases of real estate, repairing of dwelling, purchases of cars, material aid for relatives, and payment for high education. Obviously remittances have lots of indirect effects which are in most cases difficult to quantify. First, remittances spent to pay for higher education enhance formation of the country's human capital contributing to higher potential GDP. Second, some returning migrants invest money in new business start-ups increasing economic potential of regional economies in long-run. Remittances are also an important source of foreign exchange to Ukraine, which is especially important in view of growing deficit of merchandise trade and income balances observed in the country since 2005. Thus, inflow of remittance helps to partially compensate for increasingly negative balance of current account.
Database for CGE model
The household budget survey that we used to disaggregate income among types of households does not distinguish remittances as a separate type of income source. Presumably, respondents counted remittances as a part of "other income". However, the distribution of "other incomes" Labor income Migrants' remittances Other transfers to private sector Source: NBU across types of households does not correspond to the likely pattern of remittances in Ukraine. For example, "rich" (top 2 deciles in terms of per capita income) urban households have more than twice as much "other income" as "normal" urban households although it is unlikely that "normal" households benefit from migrant's remittances to a lesser extent than "rich" households. Thus, the statistics were adjusted so as to reflect a plausible distribution of remittances across different types of households.
Our social accounting matrix for Ukraine (input data for standard IFRPI model) is based on input-output tables at basic and consumer prices, National Accounts of Ukraine, the balance of payments, the Statistical Appendix to the November 2005 IMF country report on Ukraine, and Household Budget Survey raw data for the forth quarter of 2004. The quarterly household survey covers a sample of about 10060 households and 25700 household members. We distinguish 16 sectors (including small-scale and large-scale agricultural production) and 6 factors of production (including low-, medium-, and high-skilled labor). In disaggregating the household sector, we deviate from our practice for the more agricultural countries (such as Moldova) by not including agricultural smallholders separately because they account for less than 1 percent of all households in Ukraine.
Simulation results
Simulations results for the Ukrainian CGE model are qualitatively similar to those for Moldova. However, we use a different set of parameter changes to estimate basic macroeconomic indicators for the hypothetical "remittances-and-migration free" Ukrainian economy, given that migration and remittances in Ukraine are less predominant than in Moldova. TFP is reduced by 10 percent (scenario 1), remittances are reduced by 70 percent (scenario 2), and labor supply increased by 5 percent (scenario 3) -see Table 1 .
Results of simulations reveal that the "pure" effect of remittances was quite modest. However, indirect effects of migration appear to be much more substantial. First, some part of increase in TFP can be attributed to remittance-induced demand. Second, in case of "no migration", the economy would have benefited from higher supply of labor which, ceteris paribus, would have led to better macroeconomic performance. The net effect of remittances (accounting for both direct and indirect effects) proves to be impressive. The 2004 hypothetical economy would have lost about 7.1% of its potential without migration and remittances induced effects.
Light and food industry are the key beneficiaries of demand effects due to remittances. These sectors would have contracted by about 17 percent and 14 percent if the economy did not benefit from workers' transfers. On the other hand, machinery, construction and public administration services seem to be quite remittance-neutral sectors.
All types of households benefit substantially from remittances: their overall consumption would have been lower by 14 to 21 percent in the hypothetical "remittance and migration free" Ukrainian economy of 2004. Rich urban households appear to win the most, while households with most of income coming as government transfers gain the least from remittances and remittance-induced effects. Noteworthy, in case of increase in supply of all types of labor (by 5 percent), rich urban households may gain an extra 8 percent (the most) in terms of overall consumption. This reflects the fact that households of this type possess the highest share of skilled, well-paid labor. 
Georgia 4
Georgia is a small country that has seen a significant outflow of migrants and, at the same time, a large inflow of foreign currency in the recent years. While the available data only provide an incomplete picture, accumulated net migration since the beginning of the 1990s exceeded 880,000 individuals (with some return migrants in 2004 and 2005; Statistical Yearbook of Georgia 2007). Inward remittances to Georgia amounted to more than US$ 800 million in 2006, equivalent to about 10.2% of GDP and 72% of the incoming foreign direct investments (US$1,100 million). 5 The size of unofficial remittances is also large, about US$ 315 million or 39.4% of the total amount of remittances. 6 Meanwhile, according to the official sources, about more than a third of population (35%) is below the national poverty line: Georgia is ranked 97 th in the list of countries by human development index in 2006.
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the poverty effect of remittance flows in Georgia through direct and indirect channels within the context of the social accounting matrix based CGE model. The main questions of interest are whether and to what extent a large size in the remittance flows contributes to the production and consumption pattern of the poor. Two aspects of poverty reduction are emphasized in this study: (1) the impact of remittances on the aggregated and sectoral economic growth; and (2) the impact of remittances on poor households, their production and consumption patterns across regions. In addition, this study pays particular attention to regional differences in terms of market access and transaction costs, apart from households' factor endowments and consumption patterns reported elsewhere.
The available Georgian data cover the national accounts, including the input-output transactions table, detailed balance of payments, annual report on household surveys, 7 and row data on household budget surveys for 2004. These surveys were conducted on 3551 households inhabiting in the capital city (Tbilisi) and 9 regions through the questionnaires "Shinda 04" for household expenditures, "Shinda 05" for private and state transfers to households, and "Shinda 05-1" for households income from employment and selfemployment which are used in this study. 8 The source of the data is State Department for Statistics of Georgia (SDSG).
General macroeconomic and institutional environment in Georgia
Georgia is a mountainous country with population of 4.5 mln. and area of 69.7 thous. sq. km. The topographical features of the country's territory are very contrasting including the Great Caucasian chain (5068 metres), the medium height mountains (about 3000 metres) and inner lowlands (e.g. Kolkheti and Alazani) which are used predominantly for cultivating tea, citrus, grapes and other agricultural products (the arable area is about 11% of the territory). There are 12 regions in the country including a capital region (Tbilisi), two autonomous republics and 9 regions, which are geographically and economically very diverse. The macroeconomic structure of the economy, in terms of the average shares of value added and total output by regions (Table 3. 1.1), shows that industry and service activities are concentrated mostly in the capital city Tbilisi and a few other regions located predominantly at inner lowlands (e.g. Region 4). Agriculture is more widespread across the regions and plays a crucially important role as a source of production and employment. It accounts for about 21% in the gross value added and represents itself the largest employer of domestic labor (54%).
The macroeconomic situation in Georgia is characterized generally by high volatility originated in the external as well as internal sources of instability. A slowdown in the economic growth rates, from 11.7% in 2003 to 7.5% in 2006 at the annual basis, stems from the trade embargo imposed by Russia on Georgia in 2005 and 2006 as well as political instability and inflation pressures existing within the country. According to the annual reports of the Georgian central bank, for example, the large sizes of current account (1.2 bln. USD) and trade (2.0 bln. USD) deficits in 2006 were originated in the fall of exports, followed the The local market conditions and institutions in Georgia are characterized generally by fragmented labor and credit markets, while the number of poverty incidences is large. In order to demonstrate the poverty situation of Georgia, households are grouped into three categories based on the sample of 6754 respondents available in the household surveys. These categories include: 1) the group of poor households with monthly incomes less than 75 GEL; 9 2) the group of middle-income households with incomes varying from 76 GEL to 200 GEL; and households whose incomes are higher than 200 GEL are assumed in this study as high-income or rich ones. According to the country-wide household data, about 43% of respondents lived below the poverty line in 2004. Rural areas have a higher poverty incidence (52%) than the urban ones (35%).
The poverty profile of household groups by major economic activities (Figure 3 .3.2) is analyzed in terms of a head count ratio calculated within each group. Workers engaged into self-employment, family based business enterprises and farms have the highest poverty incidence (about 70%). One has to remark that the share of self-employed workers is very large in the economy of Georgia, equivalent to about 50% of economically active population. Among the groups considered, private employers have the lowest poverty incidence of less than 10%. large difference in intra-regional poverty (Table 3. 3.2 and Figure 3 .3.3). The median level of household incomes is lower than the mean level and this is true for all regions, confirming again a very high poverty incidence in overall. Moreover, both median and mean levels vary largely from one region to another, that is from 53 GEL and 74 GEL in Region 7 (Adjaria) to 132 GEL and 177 in Region 2 (Tbilisi). From the standard deviation values and the shapes of income distributions traced on the basis of individual incomes for every region, one can observe that differences in terms of poverty gap are also very large between the regions.
Due to a high incidence of poverty as well as fragmented credit and labor markets, commercial banks are reluctant to extend loans to clients with low-income whose land and assets are considered inadequate collateral. In addition, the capital markets, pension fund systems are underdeveloped, while the insurance market is very small (0.3% of GDP). As a result, the poor members of the society especially in distant regions have limited or no access to credit markets or employment opportunities. According to Figure 4 , households borrow funds more from physical persons (or other households) than from financial institutions and banks. One should remark also that the size of the borrowed funds varies largely from one region to another, implying a very limited access to these funds in some regions (e.g. Region 4, 5, 7 and 10). This presumably signifies the fact that access to credit and other assets in this Taking into account some of the above-mentioned features of the Georgian household sector as well as its macroeconomic and institutional environment, the direct and indirect channels between remittance flows and households well-being are analyzed. The standard CGE model, which is described in the above-mentioned sections, is modified by incorporating the regional dimension of market access, apart from differences in households' factor endowment and consumption pattern. The main questions of interest, in this respect, are whether and to what extend the poor households groups whose access to markets is limited can benefit from larger inward remittance flows and, thus, higher disposable incomes at the national levels.
CGE model with regional differences: data calibration and simulation results
The Georgian aggregated social accounting matrix is based on the standard IFPRI approach, constructed on the economy-wide data. It represents 13 production activities from 18 sectors reported in the original input-output tables. The domestic production generates 12 commodities. The production of agricultural commodities is separated between large and small agricultural enterprises. Transaction costs among institutions, including households, enterprises and government originate in domestic sales, exports and imports activities. Production factors, which are capital, labor and self-employment, are decomposed between agriculture and other production units. Labor is split to high-, medium-and low-skill components using the sub-classification of employed by major work positions.
The original social accounting matrix has been modified in this study by disaggregating the small agricultural enterprises into three groups of regions. This was done in order to enable the regional dimension of the market access and transaction costs. A basic intuition behind this is that farmers located in the remote or mountainous areas of the country face higher transportation and marketing margins than other regions. In this respect, three types of household farms with the highest poverty incidence are distinguished in the model. These are the farm families located geographically in regions with high-medium-and low-transaction costs. The grouping of regions is based on the topographical features of the country's territory. In particular, regions located at the mountainous parts are considered of having hightransaction costs, regions with small cities and arable land are of the medium-transaction costs, and the capital city (Tbilisi) with its surrounding is the third, i.e. low-transaction cost area. The regional disaggregation of small agricultural enterprises into three groups by transaction costs and household groups in the social accounting matrix is presented in (Table   Table 3 3.3.4). Clearly, urban households face lower transaction costs with about 88% of their production activities concentrated in the regions with low and medium transaction costs. As for rural households, about 40% of their production activities take place in the regions with high transactions costs.
In examining the poverty profiles, the household accounts are of particular importance because the flows of income and expenditures need to be adequately reflected in the social accounting matrix. Therefore, based on the level of incomes and geographical location, the households of Georgia are classified into six groups including rural-rich, rural-middle income, rural-poor, urban-rich, urban-middle income, and urban-poor.
Five illustrative scenarios are set out in Table 3 .3.5 for Georgia. The macroeconomic impact of remittance inflows applied homogeneously across all sectors is strongest on the private household consumption and negligible on the GDP growth rate. Remittances lead to higher domestic absorption, larger imports and lower exports. The combined effect of remittance inflows and emigration is negative with respect to all variables considered, with the strongest impact on the private consumption, domestic absorption and GDP growth rates. The growth rates of these variables in a hypothetical economy in the absence of migration and remittances in 2004 would be lower by 24.7%, 13.6% and 13.3%, correspondingly.
At the level of individual sectors, a simulated increase in remittance inflows has a strongest influence on the manufacturing output, which decreases by 14.9% and large-scale agricultural production by about 8.7%. The impact of remittances on the production of household farmers (or small agriculture) is two-fold. In regions with low and high transaction costs, the production increases by 2.8% and 1.3%, correspondingly, while in the medium transaction cost regions it falls by 2.5%. Presumably, moderate transaction costs allow these farmers decreasing the farm related activities substantially and getting involved into other kind of market related activities, once they receive remittances. The positive effect of remittances is pronounced in the construction (4.1%) and service (e.g. hotel and restaurants) sectors (2.6%). And the negative impact is on the electricity sector (-0.8%). The impact on the remaining sectors is negligible. The combined effect of remittance inflows and emigration is strongest in the small agriculture. Namely, the production of farms in regions with low, moderate and high transaction costs falls by 13%, 26% and 17%, correspondingly. Only the large agricultural sectors gain by about 14.3%.
In terms of households groups included in the model, the results reveal that emigration and remittance flows do not affect all residents symmetrically, but depend on the identity of households. In urban areas, remittances contribute to the increase of household incomes and consumption smoothing, while in rural areas the effect is positive, but rather week. For example, the groups of rural poor and middle-income households can benefit of somewhat 1% in their private consumption each, while in urban areas these groups gain 7.4% and 5.0%, correspondingly. One can observe also that the magnitude of this impact is smaller compared to that of rich households with the pure effect of remittances equivalent to 16.9% and 7.8% of private consumption, respectively, in urban and in rural areas. Consequently, remittances are beneficial to the wealthier members of this society (i.e. rich households) in both urban and rural areas. An increase in the supply of labor by 20%, on the contrary, would improve the welfare state of households in all groups, especially, of the rural poor at the outset. These households would benefit a 16% increase in private consumption under better access to labor markets. The smallest effect of labor supply is on rich urban households (about 9% of private consumption).
The conclusion to be drawn from this exercise is that, while having a strong macroeconomic Public administration/ NGOs 0,7 -3,7 -0,4 5,2 4,7 -7,9
Public services and private households 0,8 -4,5 -0,4 6,6 6,1 -9,2 Total 8,4 -6,1 0,0 8,5 8,5 -13,1 growth effect at the aggregated level, emigration and inward remittance flows do not affect all sectors and residents symmetrically. Moreover, they have a rather limited impact on poverty and income inequality. In urban areas, for example, remittances contribute to the increase of household incomes and consumption smoothing, while in rural areas the effect is two-fold. Namely, in regions with low and high transaction costs, remittances are beneficial to small farmers, while in the medium transaction cost regions the effect is opposite. Presumably, the moderate level of transaction costs allows these farmers shifting from the farm related activities to market ones, once have access to remittances. The magnitude of the impact caused by remittances on the consumption pattern is smallest for the group of poor and middle-income rural households (1.6% and 1.0%, respectively) and largest for rich urban households. Under the absence of remittances, rich households would burden a loss of about 16.9% in their private consumption. Consequently, the wealthier members of the society gain more from remittances than poorer household categories. Better access to labor markets, on the contrary, would improve the welfare states of many, especially, of the rural poor at the outset.
Policy priorities, in these circumstances, should be given to a pro-poor approach, especially, in improving institutional mechanisms through which the poor members of the society can have access to labor and credit markets within the country. With the focus on the inclusion of low-income and rural households in the financial sector, for example, the policies could be designed for meeting the needs of household farmers in distant regions. This would include also enabling various possibilities for linking remittance flows to the microfinance based mechanisms focused on promoting saving, insurance and investment within regions, as well as decreasing transaction costs across the regions. In the Kyrgyz Republic the National Bank is responsible for compiling the balance of payment and consequently for statistics on remittances at the macro level. Since NBKR does not have all required information, it has to rely on several sensitive assumptions and existing sources on money flows to estimate the magnitude of remittances. In particular, it has the following information on cross-border monetary flows involving participants in the Kyrgyz Republic:
1. Data on repatriated wages and salaries of foreign employees, who are not residents of the Kyrgyz Republic and are working on large joint ventures in the Kyrgyz Republic such as Kumtor Operating Company, the largest gold-mine enterprise; 2. Data on international monetary transfers to and from the Kyrgyz Republic done by individuals through banking accounts including card accounts (transactions below or equal to $3000 are considered as workers' remittances), money transfer systems (e.g., Western Union), as well as the postal system; and 3. Data on the number of permanent migrants to and from the Kyrgyz Republic and the estimated average value of the property that they bring with them to the country of destination.
Important limitation NBKR faces is the lack of the information on the status of workers abroad and the economic nature of the transactions they made (e.g., intra-family transfer, payment for goods/services, person-to-person loan disbursements, etc.). This leads to the fact that the current official statistics of remittances represent a mixture of money flows of different economic nature.
There were several surveys aimed at estimating the magnitude of remittances and having the profile of labor migrants. The main problem with some of them (Institute of Economic Policy 2005 and Japarov and Ten 2006) was that they used official numbers of the National bank making them dependent on their accuracy. Till recently on the microlevel the household budget survey conducted by the National Statistical Committee did not distinguish remittance as a separate source of income. The most recent report of the Asian Development Bank (2007) contains the most comprehensive analysis of the impact of remittances on poverty and financial sector in Kyrgyzstan. 3000 respondents were interviewed in the framework of this work, providing complex information on the profile of labor migrants and remittances' recipients. More detailed overview of the results of this work is provided below.
According to the survey, there were 251,5 thou. labor migrants working abroad that account for 5% of the total population and 8.1% of the population in able-bodied age. Regional distribution of the migrants has the following structure. About 70% of all migrants are from rural areas, 10% are from Bishkek and 21% are coming from other urban areas. This is very much understandable taking into account the level of development of the regions. Absolute majority of the labor migrants choose Russian Federation to work (82.5%), on the second place is Kazakhstan (12%) and only 5.5% of total migrants come to other countries.
Majority of the migrants are employed in the private sector dealing either with construction (45% from the total number) or trade activities (30.4%). Almost half of the migrants are seasonal workers. Again, as in the case of migration destination countries, migrants from Bishkek differ from other regions of the country. More of them are employed in sectors requiring higher education and higher qualification than unskilled workers have (financial intermediation, public administration, education, health care, etc.).
According to the survey conducted in the framework of the ADB's project, the magnitude of remittances coming to the country differs significantly from the official estimates of workers' remittances of the National Bank which were growing exponentially during last years ($48. Remittances mainly enter to Kyrgyzstan through banks and MTOs (78.5%), on the second place are households themselves (25.6%), on the third place are friends and relatives as a source of transfer and, finally the role of postal services is negligible. All these show that the role of informal intermediaries is insignificant.
Simple correlation analysis of the workers' remittance (the data was taken from the National Bank since it is the only source of time serves information on remittances) and different macroeconomic indicators reveals that the growth of remittances contributes to some growth in private consumption and GDP, has a positive impact on imports and indirectly on government revenues, can be associated with some employment growth in informal sector and does not produce measurable impact on inflation and real exchange rate 11 .
To have more detailed picture on the impact of remittances on the Kyrgyz economy and the welfare of its citizens, CGE model was used employing the social accounting matrix (SAM Specifically, the existing SAM has 91 sectors and households are divided into deciles for urban and rural areas. We aggregated up to 14 sectors and constructed representative household groups comparable with the groups used in Moldova's SAM, using data from the household budget survey.
Our household categories are (i) public employee households which draw more than half their income from public administration, health and social services; (ii) agricultural smallholders with more half of their total income from small-plot farming; (iii) pensioners with more than half their total income from state transfers; (iv) other rural households; (v) rich urban households (top 2 deciles by consumption); (vi) other urban households. Labor income is disaggregated into (i) low-skilled labor: head of household has general secondary or lower education; (ii) income from medium-skilled labor: head of household has special secondary or incomplete higher education; (iii) income from high-skilled labor: head of household has higher education; (iv) income from non-agricultural employment: household head is selfemployed.
Country Study: Russia
Data availability and quality
The data on immigration into Russia is notoriously unreliable due to the prevalence of illegal migration. State agencies report the number of the so-called "registered immigrants," i.e. those who comply with the laws that require that both Russian citizens and foreigners register with the authorities upon arrival to Russia (or to a new location). Alternatively, there is official data on the number of work permits issued by the migration authorities and the number of foreigners legally employed as reported by the companies. This official data on "registered migration," however, seems to significantly underestimate the volume of migration flows, especially the volume of short-term migration of low-skilled workers from the CIS countries. On the one hand, citizens of most of the CIS countries do not require visas to travel to Russia which encourages migration. On the other, the system of registration in force in Russia throughout the 2000s was extremely burdensome. In order to obtain a registration an immigrant had to satisfy a number of conditions, most importantly, he had to have a place of residence and, moreover, to obtain a permission from his landlord to be registered at this particular address. The very fact of registration made a migrant (and his taxevading landlord) "visible" and thus exposed him or her to extortion by the corrupt officials. From CIS countries 106,4 148,6 204,6 180,5 221,9 343,7 537,7 Azerbaijan Obtaining work permits was similarly burdensome. Employers also had all the incentives to encourage illegal immigration, for it gave them significant leverage over their unregistered and thus legally vulnerable workers.
As a result, even the authorities themselves acknowledge the presence of huge number of illegal immigrants. The magnitude of illegal migration is also underlined by the fact that after the registration procedure was reformed in 2007 (now foreigners don't need to ask the officials for registration, it is enough for them to simply notify the authorities about their new place of residence) the number of foreigners registering with the Federal Migration Service jumped, according to some accounts, threefold. Still, it is hard to get a reasonable estimate of the volume of migration. At the end of 2006 the head of the Federal Migration Service estimated the number of illegal immigrants in Russia at 10 million, while the United Nations Population Division (World Migrant Stock) estimated the number of international migrants in Russia at mid-year (both sexes) in 2005 at 12 million, about 6 million of them female; this number, according to the UN Population Division holds roughly constant throughout 1990s-2000s. However, independent experts in Russia criticize these estimates as overblown. According to the estimates by the Centre for Migration Studies in Moscow, the stock of immigrants present in Russia at a given moment is about 7 million. Roughly 0.5 million for them are expatriate workers from the developed countries, while 5 to 6 million are "migrant labour." No more than 0.7 million of them come through official channels, while the rest arrive on their own. Among these about 20% follow the necessary legal procedures obtaining both registration and work permit, 30% register, but work without permit, and the rest (i.e. 50%) have neither registration nor permit (these estimates describe the situation before the 2007 reform of registration system). Official data on emigration from Russia should also be treated cautiously, for it accounts only for those who have chosen to register with the Russian authorities as residing or working abroad; however, citizen have no incentives to do so, not there are any enforcement mechanisms. With all that said, the number of departures from Russia in 2006 is officially put at 54,061, with 35,262 among them going to the CIS countries. This is a marked decrease compared to the level of 2000 (145,720) . Top destinations include Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Germany, and USA. However, the official data on the number of Russian that left the country in 2006 in order to work abroad is put at 65,747.
There is increasing attention on international migrant remittances as a development policy and financial stability issue. Official statistics on remittances are primarily collected and reported through the balance of payments framework, but they are incomplete in many countries, may underreport remittance flows, and are often not comparable 12 .
The primary source of information about transborder money transfers, including remittances in Russia is the Central Bank (CBR). According to CBR 13 total money transfers to Russia amounted to $7,500 million in 2006, with most of the funds transferred in favor of residents -66% ($5.0 billion) compared with 55% ($3.5 billion) in 2005. Total outward money transfers were estimated at $18 800 million in 2006.
Cross-border remittances via money transfer systems accounted for 32% of outward money transfers from Russia in 2006 (28% in 2005) and for 17% of inward money transfers to Russia (16% in 2005). The average sum of one remittance from Russia increased by 19% in 2006 (year on year) to $546 per transaction. The average remittance to non-CIS countries was twice as much as the sum of one remittance to CIS countries ($1,349 and $511, respectively).
In 2006, the main recipients of money remittances from Russia carried out via money transfer systems were Uzbekistan (16.7%), Tajikistan (15.9%), Ukraine (15.4%), Armenia (10.1%) and Moldova (8.7%). Ukraine registered the minimum average remittance ($364) from Russia.
The main remitting countries were the United States (14.6%), Kazakhstan (11.8%), Uzbekistan (7.0%), Ukraine (6.8%) and Germany (4.8%).
The geography of inward remittances was wider than that of outward remittances. In 2006, the top three remitting countries contributed one-third of money received in Russia whereas the top three recipient countries accounted for almost 50% of remittances from Russia. As for the country profile of money transfers, Kazakhstan was the only CIS country, which remitted more funds to Russia than it received. The transfer of money from the sale of property by migrants leaving Kazakhstan for permanent residence in Russia played a noticeable role in these remittances.
Remittances without quid pro quo
The largest amount of money transfers from Russia went to China ($2.5 billion) compared with other countries. These operations were largely conducted by non-residents. In terms of value, they accounted for one-third of all money transfers by non-residents from Russia. The average transaction was relatively large and equaled about $20,000, exceeding by 30 times the amount of one money transfer by a non-resident from Russia to CIS countries. Over 60% of these transactions were performed by non-resident individuals from the Far Eastern and Urals Federal Districts of Russia, with the average size of a transaction equaling $50,000. According to estimates, these transactions are related to payments for goods imported into Russia without proper customs clearance rather than to remittances without quid pro quo.
More than half of money transfers to Turkey were made by residents. Payments for the import of consumer goods and the services of travel agencies accounted for one-third of that amount.
According to Word Bank estimates, the volume of inward remittance flow to Russia in 2006 was $3 091 million, with the stock of emigrants estimated at 11.5 million. As one can see WB's estimates are twice as big as CBR's are. This is the case of inconsistency in statistical methods or incorrect terminology. CBR's figures on remittances include only personal transborder transfers, contrary to the WB methodology which includes transborder compensation of employees.
The volume of remittances sent home by foreign workers in Russia is estimated by the World Bank (Migration and Remittances Factbook) at $11,436 million (2006), or 11.2% of GDP, of which $4,587 million are workers' remittances, and $6,038 million is defined as compensation of employees. The volume of remittances in 2006 increased sharply compared to the previous year ($6,989) and even more so, compared to 2000 ($1,101 million). These estimates are made on the assumption that the stock of immigrants in Russia in 2005 was 12 million, as estimated by the UN Population Division.
Statistical base for social accounting matrices (SAM) in Russia is a "System of Input-output tables of Russia" published by Goskomstat. The last publication contains 2003 data. In order to build a Russian SAM for 2004 we had to update data using the available information from the National Accounts and Russian statistical Yearbook for 2004. Structure of this database is close to the data requirements for the Standard IFPRI model (Lofgren et al. 2002) , with one exception: there is no data on transport and trade mark-ups. 
Experiment design
Designing experiments for this model we keep in mind two possible channels of influence of an increase in migration on Russian economy: a direct one, accounting for a hypothetic increase in immigration; and an indirect one, steaming from an increase in total factor productivity in selected industries which are usual employers of immigrants.
We conducted three series of simulations, exploring direct and indirect effects of an increase in migration. In the first series consisted of ten experiments, we look at direct consequences of a 10% increase in migration and remittances relative to a previous simulation. Thus in the last simulation a cumulative increase relative to the benchmark is two-fold. The GAMS code and Other services A_sec19 Housing A_sec20
Health sports social security education culture and arts services A_sec21 Science A_sec22
Finance administration defense and civil organizations / In each simulation total factor productivity in services increases by 0.05% Table 4 .7. Design of the first set of simulations, an increase in immigration and remittances.
GAMS CODE: Experiment 1
Parameter SHRMIGR /0.14/; trnsfrSIM(H,SIMNTBASE(SIM)) = (1 + (ord(SIM)-1)/10) * trnsfr(H,'ROW'); QFSSIM('LAB',SIMNTBASE(SIM)) = ((1 + (ord(SIM)-1)/10)*SHRMIGR + (1-SHRMIGR)) * QFS0('LAB');
In each simulation households transfers to ROW (interpreted as remittances) and stock of immigrants in labour force increase by 1% relative to previous simulation. A first simulation is equivalent to benchmark. Migration and remittances increase twofold in last simulation relative to benchmark. some additional information on the design of the first set of simulations is in the Table 4 .7.
We assume that the share of remittances in the labour income of immigrants is constant. Thus the volume of remittances in local currency units (LCU) increases by the same factor as immigration does. The second set of simulations aims on assessing indirect effects of increasing migration. According to Table 4 .4 most officially registered immigrants are employed in construction (40% in 2006), trade (26%), transport (4.3%), agriculture and hunting (4.4%). We enlarged this list to cover all service sectors of the model. Indirect effect of an increase in migration is modelled as an increase in total factor productivity in service sector. In the second set of experiments we conducted ten runs. In each run total factor productivity in services increases by 5% relative to a previous experiment.
The GAMS code and some additional information on the design of the second set of simulations is in the Table 4 .8.
The third set of experiments combines design of the first and the second sets, i.e. in each experiment of this set there is an increase in labour immigration, remittances, and TFP in services.
Results
Comparing results of all simulations we can conclude that both, direct and indirect effects are working in the same direction. As for the numerical values, the indirect effect of the migration, as it is modelled in the second set, dominates the direct effect of an increase in immigration and remittances. Other services A_sec19 Housing A_sec20
Health sports social security education culture and arts services This is a combination of the set of simulations 1 and the set of simulations 2: In each simulation households transfers to ROW (interpreted as remittances) and stock of immigrants in labour force increase by 10% relative to previous simulation. First simulation is equivalent to benchmark. Migration and remittances increase twofold in last simulation relative to benchmark. In each simulation total factor productivity in services (set AASERV) increases by 0.05% The consequences of an increase in the labour migration in the model could be characterized in the following way: as inward labour migration increases, supply of labour increases for all industries, since we do not have any labour market segmentation in the model. The present model set-up does not account for unemployment, either. Thus increase in the labour force pushes wages down in the whole economy. With the supply of capital being fixed, rent rises as wage goes down (see Table 4 .11 for details).
We used the standard macro closure of the IFPRI model for all three sets of simulations. In this closure a country under investigation is assumed to be a small open economy with flexible exchange rate, fixed foreign savings and fixed capital formation.
Wage rate decrease drives domestic prices down and stimulates exports. Price ratio of tradables to nontradables goes up as well as real and nominal exchange rate, displaying the depreciation being in place.
Import is part of an aggregate commodity which is demanded by households and government for final consumption and by firms for intermediate use (see Figure 4 .2 below.)
Thus increase in volume of production gives rise to intermediate use and demand for composite commodity. In a due course, this tendency gives rise to imports.
There is only one household in our version of the model. Thus we can not differentiate between residents of the country and labor migrants. An increase in migration affects the income of the representative household in two ways. First, the wage rate declines, but the labor force increases. Second, households are assumed to be the owners of the capital, thus all capital rent goes to the household budget. With an increasing labor force and declining wage rate, plus an increase in capital rent, household income increases as a result of an increase in immigration. An increase in household income and a decrease in domestic prices give rise to private consumption in all three sets of simulations.
Experiment 2: increasing total factor productivity in services
The indirect effect of the migration, as it is modelled in the second set, dominates the direct effect of an increase in immigration and remittances.
Experiment 3: doubling the stock of immigrants and increasing total factor productivity in services
Comparing results of all simulations we can conclude that both the direct and the indirect effects are working in the same direction.
Conclusions
In this country study we analyzed direct and indirect consequences of increase in migration for Russia using standard IFPRI computable general equilibrium framework. The benchmark CGE dataset -the social accounting matrix for Russia is unique and was created for this project. We presented a report on data availability of on migration and remittances for the Russian economy. We presented three sets of CGE model runs simulating direct and indirect effects of immigration.
The most important driving force behind all results in the presented sets of simulations is a significant economy-wide wage rate decrease as a direct consequence of an increase in immigration. This effect is justified by the model settings but is not supported by the mainstream empirical literature on immigration.
From this literature we know the importance of personal characteristics, such as skill level, experience, major occupation, etc. General equilibrium analysis would be much more precise and rich with all these details incorporated in the model. This exercise could be done if there were empirical estimates of the relevant parameters for Russia. But empirical literature on the consequences of labor migration for Russia is constrained by the availability of data, which is very scarce to say the least. 
